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Abstract. Justification Logics provide a framework for reasoning about
justifications and evidences. Most of the accounts of justification logics
are crisp in the sense that agent’s justifications for a statement is con-
vincing or is not. In this paper, we study fuzzy variants of justification
logics, in which an agent can have a justification for a statement with
a certainty degree between 0 and 1. We replaced the classical base of
the justification logics with some known fuzzy logics: Hajek’s basic logic,
 Lukasiewicz logic, Go¨del logic, product logic, and rational Pavelka logic.
In all of the resulting systems we introduced fuzzy models (fuzzy possi-
ble world semantics with crisp accessibility relation) for our systems, and
established the soundness theorems. In the extension of rational Pavelka
logic we also proved a graded-style completeness theorem.
Keywords: Justification logic, Fuzzy logic, Rational Pavelka logic.
1 Introduction
Justification logics is a family of logics used to reason about justifications and
reasons for our belief or knowledge. Justification logics began with Artemov’s
logic of proofs [1, 2], however various systems for justification logics have been
introduced in the literature (see e.g. [3, 13]). Justification logics are extensions
of classical propositional logic by expressions of the form t : A, where A is a
formula and t is a justification term. Regarding epistemic models of justification
logics (cf. [7, 16]), the formula t : A is interpreted as “t is a justification (or
evidence) for A”, and some of the justification logics also enjoy arithmetical
interpretation of the operator “:”, in which t : A can be read as “t is a proof of A
in Peano arithmetic.” Note that mathematical proofs are certain justifications for
theorems. But in real life reasoning we often deal with uncertain justifications.
It seems the only work that addresses uncertain justifications for belief is
Milnikel’s logic of uncertain justifications [14]. He replaced the justification as-
sertions t : A with t :r A, where r ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1], with the intended meaning “I
have (at least) degreee r of confidence in the reliability of t as evidence for belief
in A.” Nevertheless, Milnikel’s logic of uncertain justifications has (two-valued)
classical propositional logic as its logical part. We think that the true logic of un-
certain justifications should be based on fuzzy logics. fuzzy logics are well-known
frameworks with the aim of inference under vagueness.1
This paper tries to give a synthesis of justification logic and fuzzy logic (both
systems are considered in the propositional level in this paper). We extended
justification logic and fuzzy logic to fuzzy justification logic, a framework for
reasoning on justifications under vagueness. We replaced the classical base of the
justification logic with some known fuzzy logics: Hajek’s basic logic,  Lukasiewicz
logic, Go¨del logic, product logic, and rational Pavelka logic (cf. [10]). In all of the
resulting systems we introduced fuzzy models (fuzzy possible world semantics
with crisp accessibility relation) for our systems, and established the soundness
theorems. In the extension of rational Pavelka logic we also proved a graded-style
completeness theorem.
Our systems are t-norm based, that means given an arbitrary t-norm all
connectives have associated truth degreee functions which are defined from that
t-norm (cf. [9]). The language of fuzzy justification logics includes expressions
of the form t : A, but with a different interpretation. The formula t : A can be
interpreted as “t is an evidence for believing A with a certainty degree taken
form the interval [0, 1].” In other words, t may be an evidence for A that is not
fully convincing and is only plausible to some extent. This allows us to reason
about those facts that we do not have complete information or knowledge about
them. Moreover, in fuzzy justification logics which are extensions of rational
Pavelka logic (see Section 5) we are able to define justification assertions of the
form t :r A, t :
r A, and t
r
: A that can be read respectively as “t is a justification
for believing A with certainty degree at least r”, “t is a justification for believing
A with certainty degree at most r”, and “t is a justification for believing A with
certainty degree r.”
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the axioms and
rules of the basic justification logic, and its semantics. In Section 3, we review
various t-norm based fuzzy logics. In Section 4, we introduce basic fuzzy justi-
fication logic and its fuzzy models. We also introduce  Lukasiewicz, Go¨del, and
product justification logics and their models. In Section 5 we will develop a fuzzy
justification logic whose language contains truth constants, and prove soundness
and graded-style completeness theorems.
2 Basic justification logic
In this section, we recall the axiomatic formulation of basic justification logic J
and its semantics. The language of J is an extension of the language of propo-
sitional logic by expressions of the form t : A, where A is a formula and t is
a justification term. Justification terms are built up from justification variables
1 In this paper, we use the term fuzzy logic in the narrow sense distinguished by Zadeh
in [20] (from the broad sense), namely fuzzy logic is a logical system which aims at
a formalization of approximate reasoning.
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x1, x2, x3, . . . and justification constants c, c1, c2, . . . using binary operations ‘·’
and ‘+’. More formally, justification terms and formulas of J are formed by the
following grammar:
t ::= xi | ci | t · t | t+ t,
A ::= p | ⊥ | A→ A | t : A,
where p is a propositional variable and ⊥ is the truth constant falsity. The set of
all propositional variables, all terms and all formulas of J are denoted respectively
by P , Tm, and FmJ.
Next we describe the axioms and rules of J.
Definition 1. Axiom schemes of J are:
PC. Finite set of axiom schemes for classical propositional calculus,
Appl. s : (A→ B)→ (t : A→ (s · t) : B),
Sum. s : A→ (s+ t) : A , s : A→ (t+ s) : A,
Rules of inference:
MP. Modus Ponens, from ⊢ A and ⊢ A→ B, infer ⊢ B.
IAN. Iterated Axiom Necessitation, ⊢ cin : cin−1 : . . . : ci1 : A, where A is an
axiom instance of J, cij ’s are justification constants and n ≥ 1.
We now proceed to the definition of Constant Specifications.
Definition 2. A constant specification CS for J is a set of formulas of the form
cin : cin−1 : . . . : ci1 : A (n ≥ 1), where cij ’s are justification constants and A is
an axiom instance of J, such that it is downward closed: if cin : cin−1 : . . . : ci1 :
A ∈ CS, then cin−1 : . . . : ci1 : A ∈ CS.
Let JCS be the fragment of J where the Iterated Axiom Necessitation rule only
produces formulas from the given CS.
In the rest of this section we introduce Fitting models for J.
Definition 3. A Fitting model M = (W ,R, E ,V) for justification logic JCS (or
an JCS-model for short) consists of a non-empty set of possible worlds W, an
accessibility relation R which is a binary relation on W, i.e. R ⊆ W × W,
a truth valuation V : W × P → {0, 1} and an admissible evidence function
E : W × Tm × FmJ → {0, 1} meeting the following conditions (we use the
notation Ew(t, A) instead of E(w, t, A)):
E1. If Ew(s, A→ B) = 1 and Ew(t, A) = 1, then Ew(s · t, B) = 1.
E2. If Ew(s, A) = 1, then Ew(s+ t, A) = Ew(t+ s, A) = 1.
E3. If c : F ∈ CS, then Ew(c, F ) = 1.
The truth valuation V extends uniquely to all formulas, i.e. V : W × FmJ →
{0, 1}, as follows (we use the notation Vw(A) instead of V(w,A)):
1. Vw(⊥) = 0,
2. Vw(A→ B) = 1 iff Vw(A) = 0 or Vw(B) = 1,
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3. Vw(t : A) = 1 iff Ew(t, A) = 1 and for every v ∈ W with wRv, Vv(A) = 1.
We say that a formula A is JCS-valid (denoted by JCS  A) if for every JCS-model
M = (W ,R, E ,V) and every w ∈ W we have Vw(A) = 1.
The intended meaning of the admissible evidence function E is as follows:
Ew(t, A) = 1 means that t is an admissible justification for A in w. Thus condition
V3 means: the formula t : A is true in a world w of a modelM if and only if t is
an admissible justification for A in w, and A is true in all w-accessible worlds.
The proof of the following theorem can be found in [3].
Theorem 1. For a given constant specification CS, the basic justification logic
JCS is sound and complete with respect to their JCS-models, i.e., JCS ⊢ A iff
JCS  A.
Among various papers on the justification logics, it seems the only work
that addresses uncertain justifications for belief is Milnikel’s logic of uncertain
justifications JU (cf. [14]). He replaced the justification assertions t : A with
t :r A, where r ∈ Q∩(0, 1], with the intended meaning “I have (at least) degreee r
of confidence in the reliability of t as evidence for belief in A.” Milnikel considered
the following principles:
1. s :r (A→ B)→ (t :r′ A→ s · t :r·r′ B).
2. s :r A→ s+ t :r A, s :r A→ t+ s :r A.
3. t :r′ A→ t :r A, where r ≤ r′.
along with the rule IAN with the conclusion: ⊢ cin :1 cin−1 :1 . . . :1 ci1 :1 A.
Note that JU is based on the classical propositional logic. Although axioms and
rules of Milnikel’s logic is plausible, we think that the true logic of uncertain
justifications is based on fuzzy logics. This is the approach we take in the follow-
ing sections. Particularly, in Section 5 we will develop a fuzzy justification logic
whose language contains truth constants, and show that all the principles of JU
is valid in it.
3 T-norm based fuzzy logics
In this section we recall the Hajek’s fuzzy basic logic BL from [10].2 Formulas of
BL are built by the following grammar:
A ::= p | 0¯ | A&A | A→ A,
where p ∈ P , & is the strong conjunction, and 0¯ is the truth constant for falsity.
Further connectives are defined as follows:
¬A := A→ 0¯
A ∧B := A&(A→ B)
A ∨B := ((A→ B)→ B) ∧ ((B → A)→ A)
A ≡ B := (A→ B)&(B → A)
A↔ B := (A→ B) ∧ (B → A)
2 For a more detailed exposition of other fuzzy logics consult [8].
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Definition 4. Axiom schemes of BL are:
BL1. (A→ B)→ ((B → C)→ (A→ C))
BL2. (A&B)→ A
BL3. (A&B)→ (B&A)
BL4. (A&(A→ B))→ (B&(B → A))
BL5a. (A→ (B → C))→ ((A&B)→ C)
BL5b. ((A&B)→ C)→ (A→ (B → C))
BL6. ((A→ B)→ C)→ (((B → A)→ C)→ C)
BL7. 0¯→ A
Modus Ponens is the only inference rule.
We list here some theorems of BL that are useful in later sections (for proofs
cf. [10]).
Lemma 1. The following are theorems of BL:
1. 1¯.
2. A→ (B → A).
3. (A&B)→ (A ∧B).
4. A ∧B → A.
5. (A→ B)→ (A→ (A ∧B)).
6. (A→ (B → C))→ (B → (A→ C)).
7. ((A1 → B1)&(A2 → B2))→ ((A1&A2)→ (B1&B2)).
8. (A→ B) ∨ (B → A).
The definition of the classical valuations can easily be extended to a many-
valued realm. The standard set of truth degreees is the real interval [0, 1]. Now a
truth valuation is a mapping V : P → [0, 1]. In order to define the truth functions
of the strong conjunction & and implication → we need the notion of triangular
norm (or t-norm). A binary operation ∗ on the interval [0,1] is a t-norm if it is
commutative, associative, non-decreasing and 1 is its unit element.
Definition 5. A t-norm is a binary operation ∗ : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] satisfying the
following conditions. For all x, y, z ∈ [0, 1]:
– x ∗ y = y ∗ x,
– (x ∗ y) ∗ z = x ∗ (y ∗ z),
– x ≤ y implies x ∗ z ≤ y ∗ z
– 1 ∗ x = x.
∗ is a continuous t-norm if it is a t-norm and is a continuous mapping of [0, 1]2
into [0, 1].
Example 1. Well-known examples of continuous t-norms are the followings (where
x, y ∈ [0, 1]):
1.  Lukasiewicz t-norm: x ∗L y = max(0, x+ y − 1)
2. Go¨del t-norm: x ∗G y = min(x, y)
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3. Product t-norm: x ∗P y = x · y
It is well-known that (see eg. [10]) each continuous t-norm is a combination of
 Lukasiewicz, Go¨del and product t-norms (in a sense).
Definition 6. A residuum ⇒ of a continuous t-norm ∗ is defined as follows:3
x⇒ y = max{z|x ∗ z ≤ y},
where x, y ∈ [0, 1].
From the definition of residuum, for all x, y, z ∈ [0, 1], we have
x ∗ z ≤ y iff z ≤ x⇒ y iff x ≤ z ⇒ y.
As it is shown in [10], for each continuous t-norm ∗ and its residuum ⇒, the
following holds:
x⇒ y = 1 iff x ≤ y,
for all x, y ∈ [0, 1].
Example 2. The residuum of continuous t-norms of Example 1 are the followings
(where x, y ∈ [0, 1]):
1.  Lukasiewicz implication:
x⇒L y =
{
1 , x ≤ y
1− x+ y , x > y
or, x⇒L y = min(1, 1− x+ y).
2. Go¨del implication:
x⇒G y =
{
1 , x ≤ y
y , x > y
3. Product (or Goguen) implication:
x⇒P y =
{
1 , x ≤ y
y/x , x > y
Note that the only continuous implication of Example 2 is the  Lukasiewicz im-
plication.
The following lemma is useful in later sections (we leave it to the reader to
verify the details of the proof).
Lemma 2. For all x, x′, y, y′ ∈ [0, 1], we have:
1. If x′ ≤ x, then x⇒L y ≤ x′ ⇒L y.
2. If y ≤ y′, then x⇒L y ≤ x⇒L y′.
3. (x⇒L x′) ∗L (y ⇒L y′) ≤ (x ∗L y)⇒L (x′ ∗L y′).
3 In fact this is well-defined only if the t-norm ∗ is left-continuous.
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Now suppose ∗ is an arbitrary t-norm. One can construct a t-norm based4
propositional calculus PC(∗) (in the same language of BL) and interpret the
strong conjunction & and implication → as t-norm ∗ and its residuum ⇒. Now
a truth valuation V (relative to ∗) recan be extended to all formulas as follows:
V(0¯) = 0.
V(A→ B) = V(A)⇒ V(B).
V(A&B) = V(A) ∗ V(B).
It can be shown that
V(A ∧B) = min(V(A),V(B)).
V(A ∨B) = max(V(A),V(B)).
Definition 7. A formula A is a 1-tautology of PC(∗) iff V(A) = 1 for each
truth valuation V of PC(∗). A formula A is a t-tautology iff V(A) = 1 for each
truth valuation V and each continuous t-norm ∗.
It is shown in [10] that every theorem of BL is a t-tautology, the converse
(completeness of BL) is shown in [5]. Thus BL is a common base of all the logics
PC(∗).
Theorem 2. A formula F is provable in BL iff it is a t-tautology.
In the next definition, axiom systems of PC(∗) for t-norms of Example 1 are
given (cf. [11]).
Definition 8. From the basic logic BL (in the same language of BL) one gets a
complete axiomatization of:
1. the  Lukasiewicz logic  L if one adds the axiom scheme:
¬¬A→ A (L)
2. the Go¨del logic G if one adds the axiom scheme
A→ (A&A) (G)
3. the product logic Π if one adds the axiom scheme
¬¬A→ ((A→ (A&B))→ (B&¬¬B)) (P)
Definition 9. Let L denote either  L, G, or Π. A formula A is a 1-tautology of
L iff V(A) = 1 for each truth valuation V of L.
Theorem 3. Let L denote either  L, G, or Π. A formula F is provable in L iff
it is a 1-tautology of L.
Note that Go¨del logic G proves A&B ≡ A ∧B. Further, G is an extension of
intuitionistic logic by axiom BL6, or by the linearity axiom (A→ B)∨ (B → A).
Moreover, classical propositional logic is equivalent to either  L ∪ G, or Π ∪ G, or
 L ∪ Π (cf. [10]).
4 A many valued logic is called t-norm based if the truth function of all its connectives
are defined from a particular t-norm, using possibly some truth constants (see e.g.
[9]).
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4 T-norm based justification logics
In this section we introduce t-norm based justification logics. First we consider
the basic justification logic J on the bases of fuzzy basic logic BL (instead of
classical propositional logic). We call the resulting system BLJ. Then by adding
axioms L, G, and P from Definition 8 we obtain extensions of  Lukasiewicz, Go¨del
and product logic.
The language of BLJ is an extension of the language of BL by justification
assertions t : A, where justification term t is defined by the same grammar as in
J. Thus, formulas of BLJ are built by the following grammar:
A ::= p | 0¯ | A&A | A→ A | t : A,
where p ∈ P , and t ∈ Tm. Other connectives ¬,∧,∨,≡,↔ are defined as in
Section 3. FmBLJ denotes the set of all formulas of BLJ.
BLJ are axiomatized by adding axiom schemes Appl and Sum (from Defini-
tion 1) to axiom schemes of BL (axioms BL1-BL7 from Definition 4). The rules
of inference of BLJ are the same as those of J, i.e. MP and IAN (from Defini-
tion 1), with the difference that the axiom instance A in the Iterated Axiom
Necessitation rule should be now an axiom instance of BLJ.
A constant specification CS for BLJ is a set of formulas of the form cin : cin−1 :
. . . : ci1 : A (n ≥ 1), where cij ’s are justification constants and A is an axiom
instance of BLJ, such that it is downward closed. Let BLJCS be the fragment of
BLJ where the Iterated Axiom Necessitation rule only produces formulas from
the given CS.
The definition of F-models for J can be easily extended to give models for BLJ,
by replacing the set of truth values {0, 1} to [0, 1]. In fact, we define F-models for
BLJ in such a way that the truth valuation V and admissible evidence function
E in many-valued logic BLJ be a generalization of those in classical two-valued
logic J.
Definition 10. Let ∗ be a t-norm and ⇒ be its residuum. A structure M∗ =
(W ,R, E ,V) (relative to ∗) is a fuzzy Fitting model for BLJCS (or simply is a
BLJCS-model), if W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, R is a (two-valued)
accessibility relation on W, V is a truth valuation of propositional variables in
each world V : W × P → [0, 1], and E is a fuzzy admissible evidence function
E :W × Tm× FmBLJ → [0, 1] satisfying the following conditions:5
FE1. If Ew(s, A→ B) ∗ Ew(t, A) ≤ Ew(s · t, B).
FE2. Ew(s, A) ≤ Ew(t+ s, A), Ew(s, A) ≤ Ew(s+ t, A).
FE3. If c : F ∈ CS, then Ew(c, F ) = 1, for every w ∈ W.
The truth valuation V extends uniquely to all formulas of BLJ as follows:
V1. Vw(0¯) = 0,
V2. Vw(A→ B) = Vw(A)⇒ Vw(B),
5 We continue to write Ew(t, A) for E(w, t, A), and Vw(A) for V(w,A).
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V3. Vw(A&B) = Vw(A) ∗ Vw(B),
V4. Vw(t : A) = Ew(t, A) ∗ V

w (A),
where
Vw (A) = inf{Vv(A) | wRv}.
A formula A is BLJCS-valid if Vw(A) = 1, for every continuous t-norm ∗ and
every BLJCS-model M∗ = (W ,R, E ,V) and every w ∈ W.
Note that conditions FE1 − FE3 in the above definition are generalizations
of conditions E1−E3 of Definition 3. The intended meaning of fuzzy admissible
evidence function E is as follows: t is an admissible evidence for A in w with the
certainty degree Ew(t, A). Moreover, Ew(t, A) = 1 means that t is an admissible
evidence for A in w (as in the classical case). It seems that conditions FE1-FE3
are meaningful. For example, condition FE2 means that the certainty degree of
t+s (or s+t) for A in w is greater or at least equal to that of t for A in w. In other
words, if we strengthen a justification (or reason) of a fact by adding another
justification, then the certainty degree of our justification will be increased.
The definition of Vw indeed comes from the evaluation of modal formulas in
many-valued modal logics with crisp accessibility relation (see e.g. [6, 19])
Vw(A) = inf{Vv(A) | wRv}.
Note that in many-valued modal logics it is not difficult to show that (see
e.g. [19])
Vw((A→ B)) ∗ Vw(A) ≤ Vw(B) (1)
for every world w. This shows that the modal axiom K, (A → B) → (A →
B), is valid in many-valued modal logics with crisp accessibility relation. It
is shown in [4] that in general the axiom K is not valid in many-valued modal
logics.
Next, we establish the soundness theorem for BLJ.
Theorem 4. For any constant specification CS for BLJ, if F is provable in
BLJCS, then F is BLJCS-valid.
Proof. Assume that F is provable in BLJCS. By induction on the proof of F we
show that F is BLJCS-valid. Let ∗ be an arbitrary t-norm andM∗ = (W ,R, E ,V)
be an arbitrary BLJCS-model relative to ∗ and w be an arbitrary world in W .
We have to show that Vw(F ) = 1. First suppose that F is an axiom.
• By Theorem 2, all axioms of BL are t-tautologies. Thus, the result is known
for axioms of BL.
• Suppose F is s : (A→ B)→ (t : A→ (s · t) : B). By FE1, we have
Ew(s, A→ B) ∗ Ew(t, A) ≤ Ew(s · t, B).
On the other hand, from (1) we have
Vw (A→ B) ∗ V

w (A) ≤ V

w (B).
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Hence, by the properties of t-norms
Ew(s, A→ B) ∗ V

w (A→ B) ∗ Ew(t, A) ∗ V

w (A) ≤ Ew(s · t, B) ∗ V

w (B).
Thus, by V4,
Vw(s : (A→ B)) ∗ Vw(t : A) ≤ Vw(s · t : B),
or
Vw(s : (A→ B) ≤ Vw(t : A)⇒ Vw(s · t : B),
that is
Vw(s : (A→ B) ≤ Vw(t : A→ s · t : B).
Therefore, V(F ) = 1.
• Suppose F is s : A→ (s+ t) : A. By FE2,
Ew(s, A) ≤ Ew(s+ t, A).
Hence, by the properties of t-norms
Ew(s, A) ∗ V

w (A) ≤ Ew(s+ t, A) ∗ V

w (A).
Thus, by V4,
Vw(s : A) ≤ Vw(s+ t : A).
Therefore, Vw(F ) = 1. The case for s : A→ (t+ s) : A is similar.
Now suppose F is obtained from G and G→ F by MP. It is easy to verify that
if Vw(G) = Vw(G→ F ) = 1 then Vw(F ) = 1.
Finally, suppose F = cin : cin−1 : . . . : ci1 : A is obtained by the rule IAN.
Thus cin : cin−1 : . . . : ci1 : A ∈ CS. Since CS is downward closed we have
cij : cij−1 : . . . : ci1 : A ∈ CS,
for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Since M is a BLJCS-model, we have
Ew(cij , cij−1 : . . . : ci1 : A) = 1,
for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n. It is easy to prove, by induction on j, that
Vv(cij : cij−1 : . . . : ci1 : A) = 1,
for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n and for every v ∈ W . Therefore
Vw(cin : cin−1 : . . . : ci1 : A) = 1.
⊓⊔
It remains open whether the converse of the above theorem, that is the complete-
ness theorem, does hold. Let us now introduce Mkrtychev models (or M-models
for short) for BLJ which are singleton fuzzy Fitting models.
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Definition 11. Let ∗ be a t-norm and ⇒ be its residuum. A structure M∗ =
(E ,V) (relative to ∗) is a fuzzy M-model for BLJCS (or BLJCS-M-model), if V
is a truth valuation of propositional variables V : P → [0, 1], and E is a fuzzy
admissible evidence function E : Tm × FmBLJ → [0, 1] satisfying the following
conditions:
1. If E(s, A→ B) ∗ E(t, A) ≤ E(s · t, B).
2. E(s, A) ≤ E(t+ s, A), E(s, A) ≤ E(s+ t, A).
3. If c : F ∈ CS, then E(c, F ) = 1.
The truth valuation V extends uniquely to all formulas of BLJ as follows:
1. V(0¯) = 0,
2. V(A→ B) = V(A)⇒ V(B),
3. V(A&B) = V(A) ∗ V(B),
4. V(t : A) = E(t, A).
A formula A is BLJCS-M-valid if V(A) = 1 for every continuous t-norm ∗ and
every BLJCS-M-model M∗ = (E ,V).
The soundness theorem of BLJ with respect to M-models is a consequence of
Theorem 4.
Theorem 5. For any constant specification CS for BLJ, if F is provable in
BLJCS, then F is BLJCS-M-valid.
Now let us define extensions of BLJ.
Definition 12. The following logics have the same language as BLJ.
1.  LJ is obtained from BLJ by adding the axiom scheme L.
2. GJ is obtained from BLJ by adding the axiom scheme G.
3. ΠJ is obtained from BLJ by adding the axiom scheme P.
In the rest of this section let L denote either  LJ, GJ, or ΠJ. Note that the
axiom instance A in the Iterated Axiom Necessitation rule in L should be now
an axiom instance of L. The definition of constant specifications CS for L and
LCS are similar to those of J.
Definition 13. An BLJCS-model M∗ = (W ,R, E ,V) is an
1.  LJ-model if the t-norm ∗ is ∗L.
2. GJ-model if the t-norm ∗ is ∗G.
3. ΠJ-model if the t-norm ∗ is ∗P .
A formula A is LCS-valid if Vw(A) = 1 for each LCS-model M = (W ,R, E ,V)
and every w ∈ W.
Now soundness of  LJ, GJ, and ΠJ with respect to their models can be obtained
easily from Theorems 3 and 4.
Theorem 6. For a given constant specification CS for L, if F is provable in
LCS, then F is LCS-valid.
M-models for  LJ, GJ, and ΠJ can be defined similar to M-models of BLJ, and
the soundness theorem also holds for M-validity.
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5 Fuzzy justification logics with truth constants
In classical propositional logic the truth constants ⊤ (truth) and ⊥ (falsity) can
be defined respectively by p ∨ ¬p and p ∧ ¬p, for some propositional variable p.
But in many-valued logics (introduced in Section 4) we cannot define all truth
values [0, 1] in our object language, and thus they may be added explicitly to
the language. A well-known fuzzy logic with truth constants was introduced by
Pavelka [18] (for a recent account of this logic see [17]). Hajek [10] gives a simple
formulation of this logic, called Rational Pavelka Logic RPL, in which rational
numbers in [0, 1], as truth constants, are added to the language of  Lukasiewicz
logic  L. In this section, we first recall RPL, and then extend it with justification
assertions, and prove a soundness and a graded-style completeness theorem.
The language of RPL is an extension of the language of  Lukasiewicz logic  L
by truth constants r¯, for each rational number r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]. More precisely,
formulas of RPL is constructed by the following grammar:
A ::= p | r¯ | A&A | A→ A,
where p ∈ P and r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]. Formulas of the form r¯ → A are called graded
formulas. Axioms and rules of RPL is given by adding the following bookkeeping
axiom schemes for truth constants to axioms and rules of  L:
TC1. (r¯ → r¯′) ≡ r ⇒L r′,
TC2. (r¯&r¯′) ≡ r ∗L r′,
for all r, r′ ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1].
Note that if r ≤ r′, then r ⇒L r′ = 1. Therefore, by TC1, (r¯ → r¯′) ≡
r ⇒L r′ = 1¯. Since RPL ⊢ 1¯, we can conclude that RPL ⊢ r¯ → r¯′.
A truth valuation V of formulas of RPL is defined similar to that of  L, with
the following addition:
V(r¯) = r
for any r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]. By this definition, it is obvious that a graded formula
r¯ → A is true iff the truth value of A is at least r, i.e.
V(r¯ → A) = 1 iff r ≤ V(A).
A truth valuation V of RPL is a model of a finite set of RPL-formulas T , if
V(A) = 1 for all A ∈ T . The following strong completeness theorem for RPL is
proved in [10].
Theorem 7. Let T be a finite set of RPL-formulas, and F be an RPL-formula.
RPL ⊢ F iff F is true in every model of T .
Now by adding justification assertions to RPL, we give a Pavelka based justi-
fication logic. We denote this system by RPLJ. Formulas of RPLJ are constructed
by the following grammar:
A ::= p | r¯ | A&A | A→ A | t : A,
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where p ∈ P , r ∈ Q∩ [0, 1], and t ∈ Tm (here Tm is the same set of justification
terms of basic justification logic J in Section 2). The connectives ¬,∧,∨,≡,↔
are defined as in BL.
Thanks to truth constants, the following useful operators can be defined in
the language of RPLJ:
t :r A := r¯ → t : A
t :r A := t : A→ r¯
t
r
: A := r¯ ↔ t : A = (t :r A) ∧ (t :
r A)
Informally, t :r A, t :
r A, and t
r
: A can be read respectively as (see Lemma
8)
– “t is a justification for believing A with certainty degree at least r”,
– “t is a justification for believing A with certainty degree at most r”,
– “t is a justification for believing A with certainty degree r.”
Formulas of the form t :r A, t :
r A, or t
r
: A are called graded justification
assertions.6
Definition 14. Pavelka based justification logic RPLJ is given by adding the
axiom schemes Sum and Appl (from Definition 1) and the following rule to
axioms and rules of RPL:
GIAN. Graded Iterated Axiom Necessitation Rule:
⊢ cin
1
: cin−1
1
: . . .
1
: ci1
1
: A,
where A is an axiom instance of RPLJ, cij ’s are arbitrary justification con-
stants and n ≥ 1.
Note that in contrast to the language of BLJ, in RPLJ we are able to express
explicitly the certainty degree of a justification for a statement. Particularly, in
BLJ for an axiom instance A, by rule IAN, we could deduce c : A, for some
constant c, which means that c is an evidence for A with a certainty degree
taken form the interval [0, 1]. But in RPLJ, we could deduce c
1
: A which means
that c is a completely convincing evidence for A, and this is what we expect.
Definition 15 (Constant specification). A constant specification CS is a set
of formulas of the form
cin
1
: cin−1
1
: . . .
1
: ci1
1
: A,
where n ≥ 1, cij ’s are arbitrary justification constants and A is an axiom instance
of RPLJ, such that it is downward closed..
6 A similar approach but in the framework of modal logics was given by Mironov [15].
Mironov presented a fuzzy modal logic with modalities a, where a is a member of
a complete lattice, so that aA is read “the plausibility measure of A is equal to a.”
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Definition 16. A constant specification CS is axiomatically appropriate if for
each axiom instance A of RPLJ there is a constant c such that c
1
: A ∈ CS, and
in addition if F ∈ CS, then c
1
: F ∈ CS for some constant c.
For a constant specification CS, RPLJCS is a fragment of RPLJ in which the
rule GIAN only produces formulas from the given CS. For a set of formulas T ,
formula A and constant specification CS, we write T ⊢CS A if A is derived from
T in RPLJCS.
Lemma 3. Given an arbitrary constant specification CS, the following state-
ments are theorems of RPLJCS. For all RPLJ-formulas A, all t ∈ Tm, and all
r, r′ ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]:
1. t :1 A.
2. t :0 A.
3. ¬t :r A→ t :r A.
4. ¬t :r A→ t :r A.
5. t :r′ A→ t :r A, where r ≤ r′.
6. t :1 A ≡ t
1
: A.
7. t
1
: A→ t : A.
8. t :r A ∨ t :r A.
Proof. 1. By Lemma 1 clause 2,
1¯→ (t : A→ 1¯).
Since 1¯ is provable in RPLJCS (Lemma 1 clause 1), by MP,
t : A→ 1¯.
That is, t :1 A.
2. t :0 A is an instance of axiom BL7, i.e. 0¯→ t : A.
3. Note that ¬t :r A is an abbreviation of (t : A→ r¯)→ 0¯. Now by axiom BL6,
((t : A→ r¯)→ 0¯)→ (((r¯ → t : A)→ 0¯)→ 0¯),
or, in our notations, ¬t :r A → ¬¬t :r A. Then, by axiom L of  Lukasiewicz
logic and axiom BL1 using MP, we obtain ¬t :r A→ t :r A.
4. Similar to clause 3.
5. As mentioned above, if r ≤ r′, then ⊢CS r¯ → r¯′, and therefore by axiom BL1
and MP, we obtain
(r¯′ → t : A)→ (r¯ → t : A).
That is, t :r′ A→ t :r A.
6. By Lemma 1 clause 4, t
1
: A→ t :1 A. For the converse, by Lemma 1 clause
2, we have
t :1 A→ (t :1 A→ t :
1 A).
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From this and clause 1 using MP, we obtain t :1 A → t :1 A. Hence, by
Lemma 1 clause 5 using MP,
t :1 A→ (t :1 A ∧ t :
1 A).
That is, t :1 A→ t
1
: A.
7. By clause 6, t
1
: A → t :1 A, or t
1
: A → (1¯ → t : A) is provable in RPLJCS.
By Lemma 1 clause 6,
(t
1
: A→ (1¯→ t : A))→ (1¯→ (t
1
: A→ t : A))
is provable in RPLJCS, from this by MP we infer 1¯ → (t
1
: A → t : A). And
thus, t
1
: A→ t : A is provable in RPLJCS.
8. By Lemma 1 clause 8, (r¯ → t : A) ∨ (t : A→ r¯). That is t :r A ∨ t :r A. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. Given an arbitrary constant specification CS, the following rules are
admissible in RPLJCS. For all RPLJ-formulas A and B, all t ∈ Tm, and all
r, r′ ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]:
1. Graded Modus Ponens:
r¯ → (A→ B) r¯′ → A
r ∗L r′ → B
GMP
2. Justified Graded Modus Ponens:
r¯→ s : (A→ B) r¯′ → t : A
r ∗L r′ → s · t : B
JGMP
or
s :r (A→ B) t :r′ A
s · t :r∗Lr′ B
JGMP
3. Monotonicity:
s :r A
s+ t :r A
Mon1
s :r A
t+ s :r A
Mon2
Proof. The proof of clause 1 can be found in [10]. For clause 2, suppose r¯ → s :
(A→ B) and r¯′ → t : A are provable in RPLJCS. Thus,
(r¯ → s : (A→ B))&(r¯′ → t : A)
is provable in RPLJCS. Hence, from Lemma 1 clause 7 using MP,
(r¯&r¯′)→ (s : (A→ B)&t : A).
From this and axiom TC2, it follows that
r ∗L r′ → (s : (A→ B)&t : A).
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Moreover, from axiom Appl and BL5a we deduce that
(s : (A→ B)&t : A)→ s · t : B.
Therefore, r ∗L r′ → s · t : B.
For clause 3, suppose that s :r A, i.e. r¯ → s : A, is provable in in RPLJCS.
Now from this and axiom BL1, we obtain r¯ → s+ t : A, or s+ t :r A. ⊓⊔
From rules JGMP, Mon1, and Mon2, it is immediately follows that the fol-
lowing rules are also admissible in RPLJCS:
s
r
: (A→ B) t
r′
: A
s · t :r∗Lr′ B
JGMP ′,
s
r
: A
s+ t :r A
Mon′1,
s
r
: A
t+ s :r A
Mon′2.
The following form of the Deduction Theorem holds in RPLJ. The proof is
similar to that given in [10] for BL.
Lemma 5 (Deduction Theorem). T,A ⊢CS B iff T ⊢CS An → B for some
n, where An := A& . . .&A, n times.
Note that the ordinary deduction theorem, T,A ⊢ B iff T ⊢ A → B, only
holds in Go¨del justification logic GJ (for more details cf. [10]).
Lemma 6 (Lifting Lemma). Given axiomatically appropriate constant spec-
ification CS, if
A1, . . . , An ⊢CS F,
then there is a justification term t(x1, . . . , xn), for variables x1, . . . , xn, such that
x1
1
: A1, . . . , xn
1
: An ⊢CS t(x1, . . . , xn)
1
: F.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation of F . We have two base cases:
– If F is an axiom, then there is a justification constant c such that c : F ∈ CS.
Put t := c, and use IAN to obtain c
1
: F .
– If F = Ai, then put t := xi.
For the induction step we have two cases.
– Suppose F is obtained by Modus Ponens from G→ F and G. By the induc-
tion hypothesis, there are terms u(x1, . . . , xn) and v(x1, . . . , xn) such that
x1
1
: A1, . . . , xn
1
: An ⊢CS u(x1, . . . , xn)
1
: (G→ F ),
and
x1
1
: A1, . . . , xn
1
: An ⊢CS v(x1, . . . , xn)
1
: G.
Then put t := u.v, and use the rule JGMP′ to obtain
x1
1
: A1, . . . , xn
1
: An ⊢CS u(x1, . . . , xn) · v(x1, . . . , xn) :1 F,
which, by Lemma 3 clause 6, implies that
x1
1
: A1, . . . , xn
1
: An ⊢CS u(x1, . . . , xn) · v(x1, . . . , xn)
1
: F.
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– Suppose F is obtained from the rule GIAN, so F = cin
1
: cin−1
1
: . . . : ci1
1
: B ∈
CS, for some axiom instance B. Then since CS is axiomatically appropriate,
there is a justification constant c such that c
1
: cin
1
: cin−1
1
: . . . : ci1
1
: B ∈ CS.
Put t := c. ⊓⊔
Lemma 7 (Internalization Lemma). Given an axiomatically appropriate con-
stant specification CS, if ⊢CS F , then there is a justification term t such that
⊢CS t : F .
Proof. Special case of Lemma 6. ⊓⊔
Next we introduce fuzzy Fitting models for RPLJ.
Definition 17. A structure M = (W ,R, E ,V) is a fuzzy Fitting model for
RPLJCS (or simply is a RPLJCS-model), if it is a  LJ-model such that E is a
fuzzy admissible evidence function E :W × Tm×FmRPLJ → [0, 1] satisfying the
following conditions:
FE1. If Ew(s, A→ B) ∗L Ew(t, A) ≤ Ew(s · t, B).
FE2. Ew(s, A) ≤ Ew(t+ s, A), Ew(s, A) ≤ Ew(s+ t, A).
FE3. If c
1
: F ∈ CS, then Ew(c, F ) = 1, for every w ∈ W.
The truth valuation V extends uniquely to all formulas of BLJ as follows:
V1. Vw(r¯) = r, for all r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1],
V2. Vw(A→ B) = Vw(A)⇒L Vw(B),
V3. Vw(A&B) = Vw(A) ∗L Vw(B),
V4. Vw(t : A) = Ew(t, A) ∗L V

w (A),
where
Vw (A) = inf{Vv(A) | wRv}.
Definition 18. – For a RPLJCS-model M = (W ,R, E ,V) and a set of formu-
las T , M is a model of T if Vw(F ) = 1, for all formulas F ∈ T and all
w ∈ W.
– We say that a formula F is a semantic consequence of T in RPLJCS, written
T |=CS F , if every RPLJCS-model of T is a RPLJCS-model of F (or more
precisely of {F}).
– A formula F is RPLJCS-valid if |=CS F .
For a model M = (W ,R, E ,V) sometimes we write w ∈M instead of w ∈ W .
The truth valuation of graded justification assertions are as follows:
Vw(t :r A) = r ⇒L Vw(t : A), (2)
Vw(t :
r A) = Vw(t : A)⇒L r, (3)
Vw(t
r
: A) = min(Vw(t :r A),Vw(t :
r A)). (4)
Lemma 8. Let M be an arbitrary RPLJCS-model and w ∈ M be an arbitrary
world. Then, the following holds:
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1. Vw(t :r A) = 1 iff Vw(t : A) ≥ r.
2. Vw(t :
r A) = 1 iff Vw(t : A) ≤ r.
3. Vw(t
r
: A) = 1 iff Vw(t : A) = r.
Proof. The proof of items 1 and 2 follows easily from (2) and (3). For item 3,
we reason as follows:
Vw(t
r
: A) = 1 iff min(Vw(t :r A),Vw(t :
r A)) = 1
iff Vw(t :r A) = Vw(t :
r A) = 1
iff r ≤ Vw(t : A) and Vw(t : A) ≤ r
iff Vw(t : A) = r.
⊓⊔
Theorem 8 (Soundness). For each set of formulas T , formula A and constant
specification CS, if T ⊢CS A then T |=CS A.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the proof of A. The case where
A ∈ T is obvious. The case where A is an axiom or is obtained from MP is
similar to the proof of Theorem 4 (in particular, it is easy to show that axioms
TC1 and TC2 are RPLJCS-valid).
Suppose F = cin
1
: cin−1
1
: . . .
1
: ci1
1
: A is obtained by the rule GIAN. Thus
cin
1
: cin−1
1
: . . .
1
: ci1
1
: A ∈ CS. Since CS is downward closed we have
cij
1
: cij−1
1
: . . .
1
: ci1
1
: A ∈ CS,
for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Let M be a BLJCS-model, and w ∈M. From FE3 we have
Ew(cij , cij−1
1
: . . .
1
: ci1
1
: A) = 1,
for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
It is not difficult to prove, by induction on j, that
Vv(cij
1
: cij−1
1
: . . .
1
: ci1
1
: A) = 1,
for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n and for every v ∈ W . We only check the base case j = 1.
Suppose c
1
: A ∈ CS, and v ∈ W . We want to show that Vv(c
1
: A) = 1. It suffices
to prove that Vv(c :1 A) = Vv(c :1 A) = 1. Observe that
Vv(c : A) = Ev(c, A) ∗L V

v (A) = 1 ∗L V

v (A) = V

v (A) = inf{Vu(A) | vRu}.
Since A is an axiom, Vu(A) = 1 for all u ∈ W . Thus, Vv(c : A) = 1. Hence,
Vv(c :1 A) = 1⇒L Vv(c : A) = 1⇒L 1 = 1,
Vv(c :
1 A) = Vv(c : A)⇒L 1 = 1⇒L 1 = 1.
Thus,
Vv(c
1
: A) = min(Vv(c :1 A),Vv(c :
1 A)) = 1.
This completes the base case. The induction step is routine.
Therefore, Vw(cin
1
: cin−1
1
: . . .
1
: ci1
1
: A) = 1. ⊓⊔
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Next we show that all principles of Milnikel’s logic of uncertain justifications
([14]) are valid in RPLJ.
Lemma 9. Given an arbitrary constant specification CS, the following state-
ments are RPLJCS-valid:
1. s :r (A→ B)→ (t :r′ A→ s · t :r∗Lr′ B).
2. s :r A→ s+ t :r A, s :r A→ t+ s :r A.
3. t :r′ A→ t :r A, where r ≤ r′.
Proof. LetM be an arbitrary RPLJCS-model and w ∈M be an arbitrary world.
1. From the proof of soundness theorem we have
Vw(s : (A→ B)) ∗L Vw(t : A) ≤ Vw(s · t : B).
By Lemma 2 (clause 2),
(r ∗L r
′)⇒L (Vw(s : (A→ B)) ∗L Vw(t : A)) ≤ (r ∗L r
′)⇒L Vw(s · t : B).
By Lemma 2 (clause 3),
(r ⇒L Vw(s : (A→ B)) ∗L (r
′ ⇒L Vw(t : A)) ≤ (r ∗L r
′)⇒L Vw(s · t : B).
That is
Vw(s :r (A→ B)) ∗L Vw(t :r′ A) ≤ Vw(s · t :r∗Lr′ B).
Hence,
Vw(s :r (A→ B)) ≤ Vw(t :r′ A)⇒L Vw(s · t :r∗Lr′ B).
Thus,
Vw(s :r (A→ B)→ (t :r′ A→ s · t :r∗Lr′ B)) = 1.
2. From FE2 we have
Ew(s, A) ≤ Ew(t+ s, A),
Ew(s, A) ≤ Ew(s+ t, A).
From these and properties of t-norms we obtain
Ew(s, A) ∗L V

w (A) ≤ Ew(t+ s, A) ∗L V

w (A),
Ew(s, A) ∗L V

w (A) ≤ Ew(s+ t, A) ∗L V

w (A).
Thus,
Vw(s : A) ≤ Vw(t+ s : A),
Vw(s : A) ≤ Vw(s+ t : A).
By Lemma 2 (clause 2),
r ⇒L Vw(s, A) ≤ r⇒L Vw(t+ s, A),
r ⇒L Vw(s, A) ≤ r⇒L Vw(s+ t, A).
That are
Vw(s :r A) ≤ Vw(t+ s :r A),
Vw(s :r A) ≤ Vw(s+ t :r A).
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3. By Lemma 3 (clause 5) and Theorem 8. ⊓⊔
Definition 19. Let T be a set of formulas, and A be a formula.
1. Truth degreee of A over T respecting CS is defined as follows:
‖A‖CST := inf{Vw(A)|M is a RPLJCS-model of T and w ∈ M}.
2. Provability degreee of A over T respecting CS is defined as follows:
|A|CST := sup{r|T ⊢CS r¯ → A}.
Definition 20. Let S be a set of formulas. S is CS-consistent if S 6⊢CS 0¯. S is
CS-complete if S ⊢CS A→ B or S ⊢CS B → A, for each pair of formulas A, B.
The proof of the following lemmas are similar to that given in [10] (Lemmas
3.3.7 and 3.3.8).
Lemma 10. If S 6⊢CS r¯ → A, then S ∪ {A→ r¯} is CS-consistent.
Lemma 11. Let S be a CS-consistent and CS-complete set of formulas. The
following properties hold:
1. |A→ B|CSS = |A|
CS
S ⇒L |B|
CS
S .
2. |A&B|CSS = |A|
CS
S ∗L |B|
CS
S .
Moreover, it can be shown that every CS-consistent set of formulas can be
extended to a CS-consistent and CS-complete set.
Definition 21 (Canonical model). The canonical modelMc = (Wc,Rc, Ec,Vc)
for RPLJCS is defined as follows:
1. Wc = {S|S is a CS-consistent and CS-complete set}.
2. S1RcS2 iff S
♯
1
= {A|t : A ∈ S1} ⊆ S2, for S1, S2 ∈ Wc.
3. EcS(t, A) := |t : A|
CS
S , for S ∈ W
c.
4. VcS(p) := |p|
CS
S , for S ∈ W
c and p ∈ P.
Lemma 12 (Truth Lemma). Let Mc = (Wc,Rc, Ec,Vc) be the canonical
model of RPLJCS. For every formula F and every S ∈ Wc, if F ∈ S, then
VcS(F ) = |F |
CS
S = 1.
Proof. First note that for every formula F in S, we have S ⊢CS 1¯ → F . Hence
|F |CSS = 1. Next by induction on the complexity of F we show that for every
S ∈ Wc if F ∈ S, then
VcS(F ) = |F |
CS
S .
The case when F is a propositional variable p follows from Definition 21. If F = r¯
and S ∈ Wc, then VcS(r¯) = r, and by definition of provability degreee |r¯|
CS
S = r.
Thus
VcS(r¯) = |r¯|
CS
S = r.
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The cases for which the main connective of F is & or → follows from Lemma
11. Finally, for S ∈ Wc if F = t : A is in S, then |t : A|CSS = 1. Furthermore,
for any S′ ∈ W such that SRcS′, by definition of Rc, we have A ∈ S′. By the
induction hypothesis, VcS′(A) = |A|
CS
S′ = 1. Thus,
VcS (A) = inf{V
c
S′(A) | SR
cS′} = 1.
Therefore,
VcS(t : A) = E
c
S(t, A) ∗L V
c
S (A) = |t : A|
CS
S ∗L V
c
S (A) = 1 ∗L 1 = 1.
Hence, VcS(t : A) = |t : A|
CS
S . ⊓⊔
Lemma 13. The canonical model Mc = (Wc,Rc, Ec,Vc) is a model of RPLJCS.
Proof. It suffices to show that Ec satisfies conditions FE1 − FE3. Suppose S is
an arbitrary world in Wc.
– Condition FE1: let
X = {r | S ⊢CS r¯ → s : (A→ B)},
Y = {r | S ⊢CS r¯ → t : A},
and
Z = {r | S ⊢CS r¯ → s · t : B}.
It is easy to show that X ∩Y ⊆ Z, and hence sup(X ∩Y ) ≤ sup(Z). On the
other hand, one can verify that X and Y have the following property: if r is
in X (or Y ) and r′ ≤ r, then r′ is in X (or Y ). Therefore, X ⊆ Y or Y ⊆ X .
If X ⊆ Y , then sup(X ∩ Y ) = sup(X) ≤ sup(Z), which yields
|s : (A→ B)|CSS ≤ |s · t : B|
CS
S .
Since x ∗L y ≤ x, for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], we have
|s : (A→ B)|CSS ∗L |t : A|
CS
S ≤ |s · t : B|
CS
S .
Hence
EcS(s, A→ B) ∗L E
c
S(t, A) ≤ E
c
S(s · t, B).
If Y ⊆ X , then sup(X ∩ Y ) = sup(Y ) ≤ sup(Z), which yields
|t : A|CSS ≤ |s · t : B|
CS
S .
Since x ∗L y ≤ y, for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], we have
|s : (A→ B)|CSS ∗L |t : A|
CS
S ≤ |s · t : B|
CS
S .
Hence
EcS(s, A→ B) ∗L E
c
S(t, A) ≤ E
c
S(s · t, B).
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– Condition FE2: it is easy to show that
{r|S ⊢CS r¯ → s : A} ⊆ {r|S ⊢CS r¯ → s+ t : A},
{r|S ⊢CS r¯ → s : A} ⊆ {r|S ⊢CS r¯ → t+ s : A}.
Thus
|s : A|CSS ≤ |s+ t : A|
CS
S ,
|s : A|CSS ≤ |t+ s : A|
CS
S .
Hence
EcS(s, A) ≤ E
c
S(s+ t, A),
EcS(s, A) ≤ E
c
S(t+ s, A).
– Condition FE3: Suppose c
1
: F ∈ CS. Then, by GIAN, we have ⊢CS c
1
: F .
Thus, by Lemma 3 item 7, ⊢CS c : F . Hence, ⊢CS 1¯→ c : F . Therefore,
EcS(c, F ) = |c : F |
CS
S = sup{r|S ⊢CS r¯ → c : F} = 1.
This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Theorem 9 (Graded-style completeness). For each set of formulas T , for-
mula A and constant specification CS:
‖A‖CST = |A|
CS
T .
Proof. We first prove that |A|CST < ‖A‖
CS
T . Suppose |A|
CS
T = r. Suppose r
′ is an
arbitrary element of {r|T ⊢CS r¯ → A}, i.e.
T ⊢CS r¯′ → A.
By Theorem 8 we obtain r′ ≤ Vw(A), for every RPLJCS-modelM of T , and every
w ∈M. Thus r′ ≤ ‖A‖CST . It follows that r ≤ ‖A‖
CS
T , that is |A|
CS
T < ‖A‖
CS
T .
For the converse, we show that for all r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] if r < ‖A‖CST then
T ⊢CS r¯ → A (this implies that ‖A‖CST < |A|
CS
T ), or rather its contrapositive.
Suppose T 6⊢CS r¯ → A. Hence T ∪{A→ r¯} is CS-consistent, and can be extended
to a CS-consistent CS-complete set S. Now consider the canonical model Mc =
(Wc,Rc, Ec,Vc) of RPLJCS. Clearly S ∈ Wc. By the Truth Lemma (Lemma 12),
Mc is a model of S, and thus VcS(A→ r¯) = 1. Therefore, V
c
S(A) ≤ r, and hence
r 6< ‖A‖CST . ⊓⊔
Corollary 1 (Fuzzy completeness). For each set of formulas T , formula A
and constant specification CS, if T |=CS A then for every n ≥ 1:
T ⊢CS (1 −
1
n
)→ A.
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Proof. Note that T |=CS A implies that ‖A‖CST = 1. Thus, by the graded-style
completeness, |A|CST = 1. Therefore, for every n ≥ 1 there is r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] such
that T ⊢CS r¯ → A and 1 −
1
n
≤ r < 1. Since ⊢CS (1 −
1
n
)→ r¯, by axiom BL1 it
follows that T ⊢CS (1 −
1
n
)→ A. ⊓⊔
Lemma 14. Every CS-consistent set of RPLJ-formulas have a RPLJCS-model.
Proof. Suppose T is a CS-consistent set of RPLJ-formulas. Then it can be ex-
tended to a CS-consistent and CS-complete set S. Now consider the canonical
modelMc = (Wc,Rc, Ec,Vc) of RPLJCS. Clearly S ∈ Wc. By the Truth Lemma
(Lemma 12), Mc is a model of S, and thus is a model of T . ⊓⊔
Lemma 15 (Compactness). For each set of RPLJ-formulas T , if each finite
T0 ⊆ T has a RPLJCS-model then T has a RPLJCS-model.
Proof. Suppose that T has no RPLJCS-model. Then, by Lemma 14, T should be
CS-inconsistent. Hence, a finite subset T0 ⊆ T is CS-inconsistent, and thus has
no RPLJCS-model. ⊓⊔
Lemma 16 (Conservativity). Let A be a formula in the language of Rational
Pavelka logic RPL. If A is provable in RPLJCS, then it is provable in RPL.
Proof. Suppose A is a formula in the language of RPL, and it is provable in
RPLJCS. Now suppose that V is an arbitrary truth valuation of RPL. It suffices
to show that V(A) = 1. Then by completeness of RPL (Theorem 7), RPL ⊢ A.
Now I aim to construct an RPLJCS-model from the valuation V of RPL. Let
M = (W ,R, E ,V ′) be defined follows:
– W = {w0}.
– R = ∅.
– Ew0(t, A) = 1, for all t ∈ Tm and RPLJ-formula A.
– V ′w0(p) = V(p), for all p ∈ P .
Clearly, E satisfies the conditions FE1−FE3, and thus M is an RPLJCS-model.
By induction on the complexity of A it can be easily shown that V(A) = Vw0(A).
Since A is provable in RPLJCS, then by Lemma 8, A is RPLJCS-valid, that is
Vw(A) = 1 for every RPLJCS-model M = (W ,R, E ,V) and every w ∈ W . Thus,
Vw0(A) = 1, and hence V(A) = 1. ⊓⊔
In fact the model constructed in the above proof is a Mkrtychev model of
RPLJ. Similar to M-models of BLJ we can define M-models for RPLJ. All the
results of this section holds for these M-models too.
6 Other justification principles
Another important principle in justification logics is the factivity axiom, referred
to as the axiom jT:
t : A→ A.
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In classical justification logics axiom jT states that justifications are factive:
every justified statement is true. Let us see how the addition of axiom jT to our
fuzzy justification logics BLJ,  LJ, GJ, ΠJ, and RPLJ affects matter (specially the
proof of soundness theorems).
In the framework of fuzzy justification logic, at first sight it seems that ax-
iom jT is unacceptable. For weak justifications (justifications with low certainty
degree) for a statement, would not necessarily imply the truth of that state-
ment. But note that in the framework of t-norm based fuzzy logics, validity of
jT means that the truth value of t : A is less than or equal to the truth value
of A, which holds in all fuzzy Fitting models that have a reflexive accessibility
relation R.7 The proof is as follows. LetM = (W ,R, E ,V) be an arbitrary fuzzy
Fitting model, w ∈ W be an arbitrary world, and R be reflexive. Then
Vw (A) = inf{Vv(A)|wRv} ≤ Vw(A).
Thus,
Vw(t : A) = Ew(t, A) ∗L V

w (A) ≤ V

w (A) ≤ Vw(A).
By adding axiom jT to RPLJ, the followings are provable:
1. t
1
: A→ A.
2. t :r A→ (r¯ → A).
3. ¬t : 0¯.
Instead of axiom jT, either of the above formulas can be added to our fuzzy
justification logics. The last one is an instance of axiom jT, t : 0¯ → 0¯, and is
called axiom jD. This axiom is acceptable if we want to axiomatize consistent
belief (i.e. it is impossible to hold contradictory belief), or normative belief (in
which the notion of “ought to believe” is concerned).
It is easy to see that jD is valid in those fuzzy Fitting models of  LJ, GJ, ΠJ,
or RPLJ that have a serial accessibility relation R. The proof is as follows. Let
M = (W ,R, E ,V) be an arbitrary fuzzy Fitting model, w ∈ W be an arbitrary
world, and R be serial. Then,
Vw (0¯) = inf{Vv(0¯)|wRv} = 0.
Thus, Vw(t : 0¯) = 0. Note that in all logics  LJ, GJ, ΠJ, and RPLJ we have that
Vw(¬A) = 1, whenever Vw(A) = 0. Hence, Vw(¬t : 0¯) = 1.
We leave the study of adding other justification principles to our fuzzy sys-
tems for future work.
7 Conclusion
We extended fuzzy logic and justification logic to fuzzy justification logic, a
framework for reasoning on justifications under vagueness. We replaced the clas-
sical base of the justification logic J with some known fuzzy logics: Hajek’s basic
7 It is worth noting that the modal axiom A→ A is admitted in many fuzzy modal
logics, see e.g. [10, 12, 19].
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logic,  Lukasiewicz logic, Go¨del logic, product logic, and rational Pavelka logic.
In all of the resulting systems we introduced fuzzy models (fuzzy possible world
semantics with crisp accessibility relation) for our systems, and established the
soundness theorems. In the extension of rational Pavelka logic we also proved a
graded-style completeness theorem.
This paper is the first study of fuzzy justification logics, and there are many
directions for further work. The main problem remain open in this paper is the
proof of the standard completeness theorem (i.e. if a formula is valid, then it is
provable). Another direction for further research is to study fuzzy versions of Fit-
ting models with soft accessibility relations R :W ×W → [0, 1]. Kripke models
of this kind have been studied in the literature for fuzzy modal logics, initiat-
ing from the work of Fitting [6]. The relationships between our fuzzy versions of
J and fuzzy versions of modal logic K is also interesting (the realization theorem).
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